Category Archives: SDM

SIM / Smart Card Deep Dive – Part 1 – Introduction to Smart Cards

I know a little bit about SIM cards / USIM cards / ISIM Cards.
Enough to know I don’t know very much about them at all.

So throughout this series of posts of unknown length, I’ll try and learn more and share what I’m learning, citing references as much as possible.

So where to begin? I guess at the start,

A supposedly brief history of Smart Cards

There are two main industries that have driven the development and evolution of smart cards – telecom & banking / finance, both initially focused on the idea that carrying cash around is unseemly.

This planet has – or rather had – a problem, which was this: most of the people living on it were unhappy for pretty much of the time. Many solutions were suggested for this problem, but most of these were largely concerned with the movement of small green pieces of paper, which was odd because on the whole it wasn’t the small green pieces of paper that were unhappy.

Douglas Adams – The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy

When the idea of Credit / Debit Cards were first introduced the tech was not electronic, embossed letters on the card were fed through that clicky-clacky-transfer machine (Google tells me this was actually called the “credit card imprinter”) and the card details imprinted onto carbon copy paper.

Customers wanted something faster, so banks delivered magnetic strip cards, where the card data could be read even more quickly, but as the security conscious of you will be aware, storing data on magnetic strips on a card to be read by any reader, allows them to be read by any reader, and therefore duplicated really easily, something the banks quickly realised.

To combat this, card readers typically would have a way to communicate back to a central bank computer. The central computer verified the PIN entered by the customer was correct, confirmed that the customer had enough money in their balance for the transaction and it wasn’t too suspicious. This was, as you would imagine in the late 1980’s early 1990’s, rather difficult to achieve. A reliable (and cheap) connection back to a central bank computer wasn’t always a given, nor instant, and so this was still very much open to misuse.

“Carders” emmerged, buying/selling/capturing credit card details, and after programming a blank card with someone else’s fraudulently obtained card details, could write them on a blank card before going on a spending spree for a brief period of time. Racking up a giant debt that wasn’t reconciled against the central computer until later, when the card was thrown away and replaced with another.

I know what you’re thinking – I come to this blog for ramblings about Telecommunications, not the history of the banking sector. So let’s get onto telco;

The telecom sector faced similar issues, at the time mobile phones were in their infancy, and so Payphones were how people made calls when out and about.

A phone call from a payphone in Australia has sat at about $0.40 for a long time, not a huge amount, but enough you’d always want to be carrying some change if you wanted to make calls. Again, an inconvenience for customers as coins are clunky, and an inconvenience for operators as collecting the coins from tens of thousands of payphones is expensive.

Telcos around the world trailed solutions, including cards with magnetic strips containing the balance of the card, but again people quickly realised that you could record the contents of the magnetic stripe data of the card when it had a full balance, use all the balance on the card, and then write back the data you stored earlier with a full balance.

So two industries each facing the same issue: it’s hard to securely process payments offline in a way that can’t be abused.

Enter the smart card – a tiny computer in a card that the terminal (Payphone or Credit Card Reader) interacts with, but the card is very much in charge.

When used in a payphone, the caller inserts the smart card and dials the number, and dialog goes something like this (We’ll assume Meter Pulses are 40c worth):

Payphone: “Hey SmartCard, how much credit do you have on you?”

Smart Card: “I have $1.60 balance”

*Payphone ensures card has enough credit for the first meter pulse, and begins listening for Meter Pulses*

*When a meter pulse received:*

Payphone: “Please deduct $0.40 from your Balance”

Smart Card: “Ok, you have $1.20 remaining”

This process repeats for each meter pulse (Payphone metering is a discussion for another day) until all the credit has been used / Balance is less than 1 meter pulse charge.

While anyone could ask the smart card “Hey SmartCard, how much credit do you have on you?” it would only return the balance, and if you told the smart card “I used $1 credit, please deduct it” like the payphone did, you’d just take a dollar off the credit stored on the card.

Saying “Hey SmartCard set the balance to $1,000,000” would result in a raised eyebrow from the SmartCard who rejects the request.

After all – It’s a smart card. It has the capability to do that.

So in the telecom sector single use smart cards were rolled out, programmed in the factory with a set dollar value of credit, sold at that dollar value and thrown away when depleted.

The banking industry saw even more potential, balance could be stored on the card, and the PIN could be verified by the card, the user needs to know the correct PIN, as does the smart card, but the terminal doesn’t need to know this, nor does it need to talk back to a central bank computer all the time, just every so often so the user gets the bill.

It worked much the same way, although before allowing a deduction to be made from the balance of the card, a user would have to enter their PIN which was verified by the card before allowing the transaction.

Eventually these worlds collided (sort of), both wanting much the same thing from smart cards. So the physical characteristics, interface specs (rough ones) and basic communications protocol was agreed on, and what eventually became ISO/IEC 7816 was settled upon.

Any card could be read by any terminal, and it was up to the systems implementer (banks and telecos initially) what data the card did and what the terminal did.

Active RFID entered the scene and there wasn’t even a need for a physical connection to the card, but the interaction was the same. We won’t really touch on the RFID side, but all of this goes for most active RFID cards too.

Enter Software

Now the card was a defined standard all that was important really was the software on the card. Banks installed bank card software on their cards, while telcos installed payphone card software on theirs.

But soon other uses emerged, ID cards could provide a verifiable and (reasonably) secure way to verify the card’s legitimacy, public transport systems could store commuter’s fares on the card, and vending machines, time card clocks & medical records could all jump on the bandwagon.

These were all just software built on the smart card platform.

Hello SIM Cards

A early version Smart card was used in the German C-Netz cellular network, which worked in “mobile” phones and also payphones, to authenticate subscribers.

After that the first SIM cards came into the public sphere in 1991 with GSM as a way to allow a subscriber’s subscription to be portable between devices, and this was standardised by ETSI to become the SIM cards still used in networks using GSM, and evolved into the USIM used in 3G/4G/5G networks.

Names of Smart Cards & Readers

To make life a bit easier I thought I’d collate all the names for smart cards and readers that are kind of different but used interchangeably depending on the context.

Smart Card|Terminal
UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) – Standards name for Smart CardCard Reader (Generic)
SIM (Mobile Telco application running on UICC)Phone (Telco)
USIM (Mobile Telco application running on UICC)SIM Slot (Telco)
Credit / Debit / EFTPOS Card (Banking)UE (Telco)
Java Card (Type of Smart Card OS)EFTPOS Terminal (Banking)
Phone Card (Telco / Payphone)

And then…

From here we’ll look at various topics:

  • Introduction to Smart Cards (This post)
  • Meet & Greet (The basics of Smart Cards & their File System)
  • APDUs and Hello Card (How terminals interact with a smart cards)
  • (Interacting with real life cards using Smart Card readers and SIM cards)
  • Mixing It Up (Changing values on Cards)

Other topics we may cover are Javacard and Global Platform, creating your own smart card applications, a deeper look at the different Telco apps like SIM/USIM/ISIM, OTA Updates for cards / Remote File Management (RFM), and developing for SimToolkit.

5G Subscriber Identifiers – SUCI & SUPI

The SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier) replaces the IMSI as the unique identifier for each Subscriber in 5G.

One of the issues with using IMSI in LTE/EUTRAN is there were a few occasions where the IMSI was sent over the clear – meaning the IMSIs of subscribers nearby could be revealed to anyone listening.

So what is a SUPI and what does it look like? Well, most likely it’ll look like an IMSI – 15 or 16 digits long, with the MCC/MNC as the prefix.

If you’re using a non-3GPP RAT it could be a RFC 4282 Network Access Identifier, but if it’s on a SIM card or in a Mobile Device, it’s probably exactly the same as the IMSI.

SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier

Our SUPI is never sent over the air in the clear / plaintext, instead we rely on the SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier) for this, which replaces the GUTI/TMSI/IMSI for all plaintext transactions over the air.

Either the UE or the SIM generate the SUCI (if it’s done by the SIM it’s much slower), based on a set of parameters defined on the SIM.

The SUCI has to be generated by the UE or SIM in a way the Network can identify the SUPI behind the SUCI, but no one else can.

In LTE/EUTRAN this was done by the network randomly assigning a value (T-MSI / GUTI) and the network keeping track of which randomly assigned value mapped to which user, but initial attach and certain handovers revealed the real IMSI in the clear, so for 5G this isn’t an option.

So let’s take a look at how SUCI is calculated in a way that only the network can reveal the SUPI belonging to a SUCI.

The Crypto behind SUCI Calculation

As we’ll see further down, SUCI is actually made up of several values concatenated together. The most complicated of these values is the Protection Scheme Output, the cryptographically generated part of the SUCI that can be used to determine the SUPI by the network.

Currently 3GPP defines 3 “Protection Scheme Profiles” for calculating the SUCI.

Protection Scheme Identifier 1 – null-scheme

Does nothing. Doesn’t conceal the SUPI at all. If this scheme is used then the Protection Scheme Output is going to just be the SUPI, for anyone to sniff off the air.

Protection Scheme Identifier 2 & 3 – ECIES scheme profile A & B

The other two Protection Scheme Identifiers both rely on Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) for generation.

This is better known as Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme, it’s primarily used for Cryptography. Crypto is crazy complex, and I’m a mere mathematical mortal, but there’s a great post on the Cloudflare blog on the topic that touches on Elliptic Curve Encryption.

So if both Profile A & Profile B rely on Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme, then what’s the difference between the two?

Well dear reader, the answer is semantics! There’s lots of parameters and variables that go into generating a resulting value from a cryptographic function, and Profile A & Profile B are just different parameters being used to generate the results.

For crypto nerds you can find the specifics in C.3.4.1 Profile A and C.3.4.1 Profile B outlined in 3GPP TS 33.501.

For non crypto nerds we just need to know this;

When the SIM is generating the SUCI the UE just asks for an identity by executing the GET IDENTITY command ADF against the SIM and uses the response as the SUCI.

When the UE is generating the SUCI, the UE gets the SUCI_Calc_Info EF contents from the SIM and extracts the Home Network Public Key from it’s reply. It uses this Home Network Public Key and a freshly created ephemeral public/private key pair to generate a SUCI value to use.

Creating the SUCI

After generating a Protection Scheme Output, we’ll need to add some extra info into it to make it useful.

The first digit of the SUCI is the SUPI type, a value of 0 denotes the value contained in the Protection Scheme Output is an IMSI, while 1 is used for Network Access Indicator for Non 3GPP access.

Next up we have the Home Network Identifier, which in a mobile environment is our PLMN (MCC/MCC).

Then a Routing Indicator, 1-4 digits long, is used with the Home Network Identifier to route the Authentication traffic to the UDM that contains that subscriber’s information, ie you may have MVNOs with their own UDM. If the routing indicator of 10 is assigned to the MVNOs SIMs then the AMF can be set to route traffic with a routing indicator of 10 to the UDM of the VMNO.

The Protection Scheme we covered earlier, with the 3 types of protection scheme (Null & two relying on Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme).

Home Network Public Key Identifier identifies which Public Key was used to generate the Protection Scheme Output.

Finally we have the Protection Scheme Output which we covered generating in the previous session.

Usage in Signaling

The SUPI is actually rarely used beyond the initial attach to the network.

After authenticating to the network using AKA and the SUCI, in 5GC, like in LTE/EUTRAN, a shorter GUTI is used which further protects the subscriber’s identity and changes frequently.

IDEALte SIM Shim Unlock Card

SIM Unlock Shims

There’s a lot of “Magic Unlock SIM” products online; IdeaLTE, U-SIM LTE 4G Pro II (sic), UltraSIM, TurboSIM etc, with no real description as to what they are or how they work,

They claim to do something to do with unlocking iPhones, but with little other info.

Being interested in SIM technology, and with no real idea what they are I ordered a few.

What are they?

They’re man-in-the-middle SIM card devices that are able to intercept requests from the UE / baseband of the device.

They sit on top of the real SIM card, between it and the SIM Slot.

One of the ones I bought had a sticker on it that helped stick it into place, the other just sat above the SIM below the phone.

This means when the UE sends the APDU to request some data from the card, the SIM-shim device analyses the request, and if it matches the rules on the SIM-Shim, intercepts it and responds with something else, ignoring the data the real SIM card would send back and injecting its own,

The use for this seems to be to do with how Apple does Carrier Locking on the iPhone. It seems in the iPhone carrier settings are ranges of ICCIDs used by the different carriers for their SIMs, and uses that to identify the carrier of the SIM.

With this information it’s able to determine if the SIM card is from the carrier the iPhone is locked to or not,

Now you’re probably seeing the value in this attack – By intercepting the request for the ICCID of the card, and instead of responding with the real ICCID, the SIM-Shim intercepts the request and sending back an ICCID of a card the iPhone is carrier locked to, the iPhone is tricked into thinking it’s talking to a card from the carrier the phone is locked to.

So let’s say we’ve got an iPhone from Carrier A, and they’ve told Apple their SIM cards have ICCIDs in the range from 0001 to 0005,
If I put a SIM card with the ICCID 0003 the iPhone knows it’s a SIM from Carrier A,
If I put in a SIM card with ICCID 9999 the iPhone knows the SIM is not from carrier A, and therefore prevents me from using the iPhone,
But if I put in one of these SIM Shims, when the iPhone ask the ICCID of the card, the SIM Shim will respond with an ICCID we set on it, so if we want to use SIM with ICCID 9999 in a phone locked to Carrier A, all we’ve got to do is setup the SIM-Shim to respond with ICCID of 0001 for example.

Phew. Ok, that’s the short run down on how it works (There’s more to activating iPhones but we’re here to talk about SIMs!).

The Hardware

So physically these are “shims” – they sit between the real SIM and the mobile phone and intercept the communications.

It blows my mind that someone’s been able to manufacture these in such a small form factor.

But there is one rather glaring flaw in having a tiny wafer that sits on top of your regular SIM, and that is if it pops up/down/ get loose and become hellish to get out.

I found their insertion and removal is a bit of a game of Russian roulette as to if it will go in, or come out, without brute force and potential damage to the device.

In the end on one iPhone I had to force the SIM tray out with a set of needle nose pliers, and my little SIM-shim was pretty beaten up and no longer useable. RIP SIM-Shim 1.

I think this may have been an early version of the same thing? Or possibly to allow dual SIM on an iPhone?

The Software

Interacting with the IdealLTE for example, is via SIM Toolkit Application for managing ICCIDs.

You can set any ICCID you want, which is cool, but limited.

Unfortunately I haven’t been able to find any way of messing with these to allow interception / replacement for other APDUs, for example if you could change the Administrative Domain to get higher access to the network.

I will at some stage put these into a SIMtrace and compare the output, and have a poke around and see if I can find anyway to change / update these, or if there’s any APDUs it responds interestingly to.

Unfortunately I’ve actually lost the new unit I had to replace the one I broke, they are very very small…

I reached out to the developer / vendor but they seem to go dark and popup under a different name, I’m not holding my breath…

Wireshark Filtering S1AP to find Subscriber Signaling

The S1 interface can be pretty noisy, which makes it hard to find the info you’re looking for.

So how do we find all the packets relating to a single subscriber / IMSI amidst a sea of S1 packets?

The S1 interface only contains the IMSI in certain NAS messages, so the first step in tracing a subscriber is to find the initial attach request from that subscriber containing the IMSI.

Luckily we can filter in Wireshark to find the IMSI we’re after;

e212.imsi == "001010000000001"

The Wireshark e212 filter filters for ITU-T E.212 payloads (ITU-T E.212 is the spec for PLMN identifiers).

Quick note – Not all IntialUEMessages will contain the IMSI – If the subscriber has already established comms with the MME it’ll instead be using a temporary identifier – M-TMSI, unless you’ve got a way to see the M-TMSI -> IMSI mapping on the MME you’ll be out of luck.

Next up let’s take a look at the contents of one of these packets,

Inside the protocolIEs is the MME_UE_S1AP_ID – This unique identifier will identify all S1 signalling for a single user.

The MME_UE_S1AP_ID is a unique identifier, assigned by the MME to identify which signaling messages are for which subscriber.

(It’s worth noting the MME_UE_S1AP_ID is only unique to the MME – If you’ve got multiple MMEs the same MME_UE_S1AP_ID could be assigned by each).

So now we have the MME_UE_S1AP_ID, we can filter all S1 messaging containing that MME_UE_S1AP_ID, we’ll use this Wireshark filter to get it:

s1ap.MME_UE_S1AP_ID == 2

Boom, there’s a all the signalling for that subscriber.

Alternatively you can just right click on the value and apply it as a filter instead of typing everything in,

Hopefully that’ll help you filter to find what you’re looking for!

Android Carrier Privileges

So a problem had arisen, carriers wanted to change certain carrier related settings on devices (Specifically the Carrier Config Manager) in the Android ecosystem. The Android maintainers didn’t want to open the permissions to change these settings to everyone, only the carrier providing service to that device.

And if you purchased a phone from Carrier A, and moved to Carrier B, how do you manage the permissions for Carrier B’s app and then restrict Carrier A’s app?

Enter the Android UICC Carrier Privileges.

The carrier loads a certificate onto the SIM Cards, and signing Android Apps with this certificate, allowing the Android OS to verify the certificate on the card and the App are known to each other, and thus the carrier issuing the SIM card also issued the app, and presto, the permissions are granted to the app.

Carriers have full control of the UICC, so this mechanism provides a secure and flexible way to manage apps from the mobile network operator (MNO) hosted on generic app distribution channels (such as Google Play) while retaining special privileges on devices and without the need to sign apps with the per-device platform certificate or preinstall as a system app.

UICC Carrier Privileges doc

Once these permissions are granted your app is able to make API calls related to:

  • APN Settings
  • Roaming/nonroaming networks
  • Visual voicemail
  • SMS/MMS network settings
  • VoLTE/IMS configurations
  • OTA Updating SIM Cards
  • Sending PDUs to the card

Diameter Dispatches: S6a Authentication Information Request / Answer

This is part of a series of posts focusing on common Diameter request pairs, looking at what’s inside and what they do.

The Authentication Information Request (AIR) and Authentication Information Answer (AIA) are one of the first steps in authenticating a subscriber, and a very common Diameter transaction.

The Process

The Authentication Information Request (AIR) is sent by the MME to the HSS to request when a Subscriber begins to attach containing the IMSI of the subscriber trying to connect.

If the subscriber’s IMSI is known to the HSS, the AuC will generate Authentication Vectors for the Subscriber, and repond back to the MME in an Authentication Information Answer (AIA).

For more information on how the Authentication process works and what the authentication vectors do, I’ve written about that quite extensively here.- HSS & USIM Authentication in LTE.

The Authentication Information Request (AIR)

The AIR is a comparatively simple request, without many AVPs;

The Session-Id, Auth-Session-State, Origin-Host, Origin-Realm & Destination-Realm are all common AVPs that have to be included.

The Username AVP (AVP 1) contains the username of the subscriber, which in this case is the IMSI.

The Requested-EUTRAN-Authentication-Info AVP ( AVP 1408 ) contains information in regards to what authentication info the MME is requesting from the subscriber, typically this indicates the MME is requesting 1 vector (Number-Of-Requested-Vectors (AVP 1410)), an immediate response is preferred (Immediate-Response-Preferred (AVP 1412)), and if the subscriber is re-resyncing the SQN will include a Re-Synchronization-Info AVP (AVP 1411).

The Visited-PLMN-Id AVP (AVP 1407) contains information regarding the PLMN of the RAN the Subscriber is connecting to.

The Authentication Information Answer (AIA)

The Authentication Information Answer contains several mandatory AVPs that would be expected, The Session-Id, Auth-Session-State, Origin-Host and Origin-Realm.

The Result Code (AVP 268) indicates if the request was successful or not, 2001 indicates DIAMETER SUCCESS.

The Authentication-Info (AVP 1413) contains the returned vectors, in LTE typically only one vector is returned, a sub AVP called E-UTRAN-Vector (AVP 1414), which contains AVPs with the RAND, XRES, AUTN and KASME keys.

Further Reading & References

3GPP TS 29.272 version 15.10.0 Release 15

Example Packet Capture (PCAP) of Message Flow

BaiCells USIM PLMN Issues (MCC 314 / MNC 030 vs MCC 311 / MNC 98)

If you’re using BaiCells hardware you may have noticed the new eNBs and USIMs are shipping with the PLMN of MCC 314 / MNC 030.

First thing I do is change the PLMN, but I was curious as to why the change.

It seems 314 / 030 was never assigned to BaiCells to use and when someone picked this up they were forced to change it.

The MCC (Mobile Country Code) part is dictated by the country / geographic area the subscribers’ are in, as defined by ITU, whereas the MNC (Mobile Network Code) allocation is managed by the regional authority and ITU are informed as to what the allocations are and publish in their bulletins.

ITU advertised this in Operational Bulletin No. 1198 (15.VI.2020)

What does this mean if you’re a BaiCells user?

Well, SIM cards will have a different IMSI / PLMN, but the hardware supports Multi-Operator Core Network which allows one eNB to broadcast multiple PLMNs, so if you update your eNB it can broadcast both!

I’ve written more about that in my post on MOCN.

Diameter and SIP: Registration-Termination-Request / Answer

These posts focus on the use of Diameter and SIP in an IMS / VoLTE context, however these practices can be equally applied to other networks.

The Registration-Termination Request / Answer allow a Diameter Client (S-CSCF) to indicate to the HSS (Diameter Server) that it is no longer serving that user and the registration has been terminated.

Basics:

The RFC’s definition is actually pretty succinct as to the function of the Server-Assignment Request/Answer:

The Registration-Termination-Request is sent by a Diameter Multimedia server to a Diameter Multimedia client in order to request the de-registration of a user.

Reference: TS 29.229

The Registration-Termination-Request commands are sent by a S-CSCF to indicate to the Diameter server that it is no longer serving a specific subscriber, and therefore this subscriber is now unregistered.

There are a variety of reasons for this, such as PERMANENT_TERMINATION, NEW_SIP_SERVER_ASSIGNED and SIP_SERVER_CHANGE.

The Diameter Server (HSS) will typically send the Diameter Client (S-CSCF) a Registration-Termination-Answer in response to indicate it has updated it’s internal database and will no longer consider the user to be registered at that S-CSCF.

Packet Capture

I’ve included a packet capture of these Diameter Commands from my lab network which you can find below.

Other Diameter Cx (IMS) Calls

User-Authorization-Request / User-Authorization-Answer
Server-Assignment-Request / Server-Assignment-Answer
Location-Info-Request / Location-Info-Answer
Multimedia-Auth-Request / Multimedia-Auth-Answer
Registration-Termination-Request / Registration-Termination-Answer
Push-Profile-Request / Push-Profile-Answer

References:

3GPP Specification #: 29.229

RFC 4740 – Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application

Diameter-User-Authorization-Request-Command-Code-300-Packet-Capture

Diameter and SIP: User-Authorization-Request/Answer

These posts focus on the use of Diameter and SIP in an IMS / VoLTE context, however these practices can be equally applied to other networks.

The Diameter User-Authorization-Request and User-Authorization-Answer commands are used as the first line of authorization of a user and to determine which Serving-CSCF to forward a request to.

Basics

When a SIP Proxy (I-CSCF) receives an incoming SIP REGISTER request, it sends a User-Authorization-Request to a Diameter server to confirm if the user exists on the network, and which S-CSCF to forward the request to.

When the Diameter server receives the User-Authorization-Request it looks at the User-Name (1) AVP to determine if the Domain / Realm is served by the Diameter server and the User specified exists.

Assuming the user & domain are valid, the Diameter server sends back a User-Authorization-Answer, containing a Server-Capabilities (603) AVP with the Server-Name of the S-CSCF the user will be served by.

I always find looking at the packets puts everything in context, so here’s a packet capture of both the User-Authorization-Request and the User-Authorization-Answer.

First Registration

If this is the first time this Username / Domain combination (Referred to in the RFC as an AOR – Address of Record) is seen by the Diameter server in the User-Authorization-Request it will allocate a S-CSCF address for the subscriber to use from it’s pool / internal logic.

The Diameter server will store the S-CSCF it allocated to that Username / Domain combination (AoR) for subsequent requests to ensure they’re routed to the same S-CSCF.

The Diameter server indicates this is the first time it’s seen it by adding the DIAMETER_FIRST_REGISTRATION (2001) AVP to the User-Authorization-Answer.

Subsequent Registration

If the Diameter server receives another User-Authorization-Request for the same Username / Domain (AoR) it has served before, the Diameter server returns the same S-CSCF address as it did in the first User-Authorization-Answer.

It indicates this is a subsequent registration in much the same way the first registration is indicated, by adding an DIAMETER_SUBSEQUENT_REGISTRATION (2002) AVP to the User-Authorization-Answer.

User-Authorization-Type (623) AVP

An optional User-Authorization-Type (623) AVP is available to indicate the reason for the User-Authorization-Request. The possible values / reasons are:

  • Creating / Updating / Renewing a SIP Registration (REGISTRATION (0))
  • Establishing Server Capabilities & Registering (CAPABILITIES (2))
  • Terminating a SIP Registration (DEREGISTRATION (1))

If the User-Authorization-Type is set to DEREGISTRATION (1) then the Diameter server returns the S-CSCF address in the User-Authorization-Answer and then removes the S-SCSF address it had associated with the AoR from it’s own records.

Other Diameter Cx (IMS) Calls

User-Authorization-Request / User-Authorization-Answer
Server-Assignment-Request / Server-Assignment-Answer
Location-Info-Request / Location-Info-Answer
Multimedia-Auth-Request / Multimedia-Auth-Answer
Registration-Termination-Request / Registration-Termination-Answer
Push-Profile-Request / Push-Profile-Answer

References:

3GPP Specification #: 29.229

RFC 4740 – Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application

Diameter - Server Assignment Answer - All

Diameter and SIP: Server-Assignment-Request/Answer

These posts focus on the use of Diameter and SIP in an IMS / VoLTE context, however these practices can be equally applied to other networks.

The Server-Assignment-Request/Answer commands are used so a SIP Server can indicate to a Diameter server that it is serving a subscriber and pull the profile information of the subscriber.

Basics:

The RFC’s definition is actually pretty succinct as to the function of the Server-Assignment Request/Answer:

The main functions of the Diameter SAR command are to inform the Diameter server of the URI of the SIP server allocated to the user, and to store or clear it from the Diameter server.

Additionally, the Diameter client can request to download the user profile or part of it.

RFC 4740 – 8.3

The Server-Assignment-Request/Answer commands are sent by a S-CSCF to indicate to the Diameter server that it is now serving a specific subscriber, (This information can then be queried using the Location-Info-Request commands) and get the subscriber’s profile, which contains the details and identities of the subscriber.

Typically upon completion of a successful SIP REGISTER dialog (Multimedia-Authentication Request), the SIP Server (S-CSCF) sends the Diameter server a Server-Assignment-Request containing the SIP Username / Domain (referred to as an Address on Record (SIP-AOR) in the RFC) and the SIP Server (S-CSCF)’s SIP-Server-URI.

The Diameter server looks at the SIP-AOR and ensures there are not currently any active SIP-Server-URIs associated with that AoR. If there are not any currently active it then stores the SIP-AOR and the SIP-Server-URI of the SIP Server (S-CSCF) serving that user & sends back a Server-Assignment-Answer.

For most request the Subscriber’s profile is also transfered to the S-SCSF in the Server-Assignment-Answer command.

SIP-Server-Assignment-Type AVP

The same Server-Assignment-Request command can be used to register, re-register, remove registration bindings and pull the user profile, through the information in the SIP-Server-Assignment-Type AVP (375),

Common values are:

  • NO_ASSIGNMENT (0) – Used to pull just the user profile
  • REGISTRATION (1) – Used for first registration
  • RE_REGISTRATION (2) – Updating / renewing registration
  • USER_DEREGISTRATION (5) – User has deregistered

Complete list of values available here.

Cx-User-Data AVP (User Profile)

The Cx-User-Data profile contains the subscriber’s profile from the Diameter server in an XML formatted dataset, that is contained as part of the Server-Assignment-Answer in the Cx-User-Data AVP (606).

The profile his tells the S-CSCF what services are offered to the subscriber, such as the allowed SIP Methods (ie INVITE, MESSAGE, etc), and how to handle calls to the user when the user is not registered (ie send calls to voicemail if the user is not there).

There’s a lot to cover on the user profile which we’ll touch on in a later post.

Other Diameter Cx (IMS) Calls

User-Authorization-Request / User-Authorization-Answer
Server-Assignment-Request / Server-Assignment-Answer
Location-Info-Request / Location-Info-Answer
Multimedia-Auth-Request / Multimedia-Auth-Answer
Registration-Termination-Request / Registration-Termination-Answer
Push-Profile-Request / Push-Profile-Answer

References:

3GPP Specification #: 29.229

RFC 4740 – Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application

Diameter and SIP: Location-Info-Request / Answer

These posts focus on the use of Diameter and SIP in an IMS / VoLTE context, however these practices can be equally applied to other networks.

The Location-Information-Request/Answer commands are used so a SIP Server query a Diameter to find which P-CSCF a Subscriber is being served by

Basics:

The RFC’s definition is actually pretty succinct as to the function of the Server-Assignment Request/Answer:

The Location-Info-Request is sent by a Diameter Multimedia client to a Diameter Multimedia server in order to request name of the server that is currently serving the user.Reference: 29.229-

The Location-Info-Request is sent by a Diameter Multimedia client to a Diameter Multimedia server in order to request name of the server that is currently serving the user.

Reference: TS 29.229

The Location-Info-Request commands is sent by an I-CSCF to the HSS to find out from the Diameter server the FQDN of the S-CSCF serving that user.

The Public-Identity AVP (601) contains the Public Identity of the user being sought.

Here you can see the I-CSCF querying the HSS via Diameter to find the S-CSCF for public identity 12722123

The Diameter server sends back the Location-Info-Response containing the Server-Name AVP (602) with the FQDN of the S-CSCF.

Packet Capture

I’ve included a packet capture of these Diameter Commands from my lab network which you can find below.

Other Diameter Cx (IMS) Calls

User-Authorization-Request / User-Authorization-Answer
Server-Assignment-Request / Server-Assignment-Answer
Location-Info-Request / Location-Info-Answer
Multimedia-Auth-Request / Multimedia-Auth-Answer
Registration-Termination-Request / Registration-Termination-Answer
Push-Profile-Request / Push-Profile-Answer

References:

3GPP Specification #: 29.229

RFC 4740 – Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application

Screenshot of packet capture of Diameter Multimedia-Auth-Request (Diameter Command Code 303) used for IMS authentication

Diameter and SIP: Multimedia-Authentication-Request/Answer

These posts focus on the use of Diameter and SIP in an IMS / VoLTE context, however these practices can be equally applied to other networks.

The Multimedia-Authentication-Request/Answer commands are used to Authenticate subscribers / UAs using a variety of mechanisms such as straight MD5 and AKAv1-MD5.

Basics:

When a SIP Server (S-CSCF) receives a SIP INVITE, SIP REGISTER or any other SIP request, it needs a way to Authenticate the Subscriber / UA who sent the request.

We’ve already looked at the Diameter User-Authorization-Request/Answer commands used to Authorize a user for access, but the Multimedia-Authentication-Request / Multimedia-Authentication-Answer it used to authenticate the user.

The SIP Server (S-CSCF) sends a Multimedia-Authentication-Request to the Diameter server, containing the Username of the user attempting to authenticate and their Public Identity.

The Diameter server generates “Authentication Vectors” – these are Precomputed cryptographic challenges to challenge the user, and the correct (“expected”) responses to the challenges. The Diameter puts these Authentication Vectors in the 3GPP-SIP-Auth-Data (612) AVP, and sends them back to the SIP server in the Multimedia-Authentication-Answer command.

The SIP server sends the Subscriber / UA a SIP 401 Unauthorized response to the initial request, containing a WWW-Authenticate header containing the challenges.

SIP 401 Response with WWW-Authenticate header populated with values from Multimedia-Auth-Answer

The Subscriber / UA sends back the initial request with the WWW-Authenticate header populated to include a response to the challenges. If the response to the challenge matches the correct (“expected”) response, then the user is authenticated.

I always find it much easier to understand what’s going on through a packet capture, so here’s a packet capture showing the two Diameter commands,

Note: There is a variant of this process allows for stateless proxies to handle this by not storing the expected authentication values sent by the Diameter server on the SIP Proxy, but instead sending the received authentication values sent by the Subscriber/UA to the Diameter server to compare against the expected / correct values.

The Cryptography

The Cryptography for IMS Authentication relies on AKAv1-MD5 which I’ve written about before,

Essentially it’s mutual network authentication, meaning the network authenticates the subscriber, but the subscriber also authenticates the network.

LTE USIM Authentication - Mutual Authentication of the Network and Subscriber

Other Diameter Cx (IMS) Calls

User-Authorization-Request / User-Authorization-Answer
Server-Assignment-Request / Server-Assignment-Answer
Location-Info-Request / Location-Info-Answer
Multimedia-Auth-Request / Multimedia-Auth-Answer
Registration-Termination-Request / Registration-Termination-Answer
Push-Profile-Request / Push-Profile-Answer

References:

3GPP Specification #: 29.229

RFC 4740 – Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application

OsmoHLR - Update Location Request

GSM with Osmocom Part 7: The HLR – Home Location Register (and Friends)

The Home Location Register serves the AAA functions in a GSM / UMTS (2G/3G) network as well as locating which Mobile Switching Center (MSC) a subscriber is being served by.

The HLR is the equivalent of the Home Subscriber Server in LTE (I’ve written a fair bit about the role of the HSS in LTE networks, and I’ve published my own open-source HSS software.)

Authentication

One obvious need is to authenticate our subscribers so the network can verify their identity,

The IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is used to identifier the user from all the other mobile subscribers worldwide. The IMSI is exposed to the user, but transmitting the IMSI in the clear is typically something that’s avoided where possible on the air interface.

GSM uses a single shared secret between the SIM and the network (the K key) for authentication. This shared secret is not exposed to the user and is never transmitted over the air.

When a user wants to authenticate, the HSS network takes a Random key (RAND) and mixes it with the secret key (K) to generate a Signed Response called SRES. The network sends the RAND key to the subscriber, and their SIM takes the secret key (K) and mixes it with the RAND value from the network, before sending their signed response (SRES) back to the network.
If the SRES sent by the subscriber matches the SRES generated by the HSS, then the user is authenticated. The set of keys used for one authentication session is referred to as an Authentication Vector or Authentication Tuple.

In Osmocom the generation of Authentication Tuples is requested in the GSUP “SendAuthInfo” request, and responded to by the “SendAuthInfoResponse” sent to the HLR by the MSC.

Side note about GSM Security

In a GSM setting the network only authenticates the subscribers, the subscribers don’t authenticate the network. In practice, this means there’s no way to verify in GSM if the network you’re connected to is the network it’s claiming to be.

Due to this shortfall and the cryptographic weakness in A5/x algorithm, 3GPP specified the AKA algorithm for mutual network authentication in 3G/UMTS networks.

I’ve written a fair bit about the role of SIMs for authentication in LTE which is the same scheme used in 3G/UMTS if you’d like to learn more.

LTE USIM Authentication - Mutual Authentication of the Network and Subscriber

Technically the generation of Authentication Vectors is handled by an Authentication Center (AuC) however OsomoHLR has an internal AuC that handles this internally.

Location Tracking

After a user has authenticated, the MSC sends an UpdateLocationRequest via GSUP to the HLR to let it know the current location of the subscriber is served by that MSC.

The Update Location Request is sent at the start of the session, periodic Update Location Requests can be sent based on the timers configured, and a Cancel Location Request can be sent when the subscriber disconnects from the MSC.

Subscriber Data Information

When the Update Location Request has been sent by the MSC, the HLR sends the MSC the subscriber’s info, and the MSC copies it to it’s own internal HLR called a Visitor Location Register (VLR). The VLR means the MSC doesn’t need to keep querying user data from the HLR.

This is again requseted by the MSC to the HLR via a GSUP request InsertSubscriberData Request which contains:

  • Subscriber’s IMSI
  • Subscriber’s MSISDN (Phone number)
  • Allowed Domains (CS/PS)

Note: In production GSM networks TCAP/MAP is used for communication between the HLR and the MSC. Osmocom uses GSUP for carrying this data instead.

Equipment Identity Register

Because mobiles are expensive they’ve historically been a target for theft.

To try and mitigate this GSMA encourages carriers to implement an Equipment Identity Register (EIR).

The EIR is essentially a database containing IMEIs (The Identifiers of Mobiles / Terminals) and permitting / denying access to the network based on the IMEI.

The idea being if a mobile device / terminal is stolen, it’s IMEI is blacklisted in the EIR and regardless of what SIM is put into it, it’s not permitted to access the network.

When a device connects to the network if configured the MSC will query the EIR (On the HLR in our case) with a Check IMEI Request, and will get a Check IMEI Result either permitting or denying access to the network.

Unfortunately, there is no global stolen IMEI database, meaning if a device is stolen and blocked on MNO X’s network, it may still work on MNO Y’s network if they don’t share stolen IMEI data.

Starting & Configuring OsmoHLR

We actually installed OmsoHLR in the post on Base Station Controllers, so we’ll just need to start the daemon / service:

systemctl start osmo-hlr

I’m going to enable the EIR functionality of the HSS by changing the config of the HLR, this is optional but it’s useful to use the EIR functionality.

Like with our other network elements we’ll use Tenet to interactively configure this one,

root@gsm-bts:/home/nick# telnet localhost 4258
Welcome to the OsmoHLR VTY interface
OsmoHLR> enable
OsmoHLR# configure terminal
OsmoHLR(config)# hlr
OsmoHLR(config-hlr)# store-imei
OsmoHLR(config-hlr)# exit
OsmoHLR(config)# exit
OsmoHLR# copy running-config startup-config

Adding Subscribers to OsmoHLR

But before we go adding subscribers, let’s talk about SIMs.

Okay, I’ve written a lot about SIMs before, but there’s still more to talk about!

There’s really only one peice of information from your SIM we require to add the subscriber to the HLR, and that’s the IMSI – The unique identifier of the subscriber on the SIM. You can typically view the IMSI from your mobile device / terminal.

If you want to authenticate subscribers properly (confirm their identity) and enable encryption on the air interface, you’ll need to know the K key of the SIM, for that you’ll need a programmable SIM card like the Sysmocom programmable SIM cards, (By buying from Sysmocom you’re supporting the Osmocom project too).

So now we’ve got that out of the way, let’s add a subscriber:

We’ll connect to OsmoHLR via Telnet, the port it listens on is 4258:

root@gsm-bts:/home/nick# telnet localhost 4258
Welcome to the OsmoHLR VTY interface
OsmoHLR> enable
OsmoHLR# subscriber imsi 001010000000004 create
OsmoHLR# subscriber imsi 001010000000004 update msisdn 61412341234
OsmoHLR# subscriber imsi 001010000000004 update aud2g comp128v3 ki 465B5CE8B199B49FAA5F0A2EE238A6BC

So I’ve created a subscriber with IMSI 001010000000004 in the HSS and assigned an MSISDN (phone number).

Optionally, if you’re using SIM cards you can program you can set the Ki / K key for authentication using the update aud2g function, if not you can skip that step.

And with that we’ve added our first subscriber, lather rinse repeat with any additional subscribers / SIMs you want to provision.

By default subscribers created using this method have access to both Circuit Switched (Voice and SMS) and Packet Switched (Data) networks. (We haven’t configured Packet Switched services yet)

If you’d like to restrict access to one, both or none of the above options, you can do that by using the subscriber update command to set the services available to those subscribers.

OsmoHLR# subscriber id 3 update network-access-mode cs+ps
OsmoHLR# subscriber id 3 update network-access-mode cs
OsmoHLR# subscriber id 3 update network-access-mode ps
OsmoHLR# subscriber id 3 update network-access-mode none

Creating Subscribers Programmatically

In reality if you’re trying to operate a network it’s not feasible to manually add each subscriber as needed.

If you’re buying SIMs in bulk preconfigured you’ll get sent a file containing the IMSI and Crypto values of each card, and you’d ingest that into your HLR.

We’ve used the Osmocom VTY / Telnet interface in quite a few posts now (hopefully you’re getting comfortable with it) but there’s another interface most Osmocom software has – the Osmocom Control Interface – aimed at providing a uniform way to interface external scripts / programs with Osmocom.

If you’d like to learn more about the Control Interface have a read of the OsmoHLR manual and take a look at this example in Python.

Creating Subscribers on Demand (Optional)

For most scenarios you would pre-provision each SIM in the HLR, if the SIM’s IMSI isn’t in the HLR then it’s access is rejected. However there are some scenarios where you may want to allow anyone to access the network, in this scenario Osmo-HLR features a “Create Subscribers on Demand” function.

This may be useful if you’re setting up a network where you don’t control the SIMs for example.

Let’s say we want to automatically create users with access to voice & data services and assign a 10 digit MSISDN for that subscriber, we can do that with:

OsmoHLR> enable
OsmoHLR# configure terminal
OsmoHLR(config)# hlr
OsmoHLR(config-hlr)# subscriber-create-on-demand 10 cs+ps

Alternatley you may wish to simply add the subscriber to the HLR but not provide any services:

OsmoHLR> enable
OsmoHLR# configure terminal
OsmoHLR(config)# hlr
OsmoHLR(config-hlr)# subscriber-create-on-demand no-msisdn none

Then if you wish to grant access to these users you can use the subscriber update network-access-mode method we talked about earlier to allow services for that user.

Packet Capture

To give some context I’ve attached a packet capture of the connection from the MSC to the HLR for some attach procedures on my lab network.

Magic SIM Card Art

16 in 1 Magic SIM Card Revisited

I found a “16-in-1 Super SIM X-SIM” in my SIM card drawer, I think I ordered these when I was first playing with GSM and never used it.

I was kind of curious about how these actually worked, so after some online sleuthing I found a very suspicious looking rar file, which I ended up running in a VM and mapping the Card Reader to the VM.

What a treat I was in for in terms of UI.

The concept is quite simple, you program a series of IMSI and K key values onto the SIM card, and then using a SIM Toolkit application, you’re able to select which IMSI / K key combination you want to use.

A neat trick, I’d love a LTE version of this for changing values on the fly, but it’d be a pretty niche item considering no operator is going to give our their K and OPc keys,

But come to think of it, no GSM operator would give out K keys, so how do you get the K key from your commercial operator?

I noticed the grayed out “Crack” icon on the menu.

After rifling through my SIM drawer I found a few really old 2G SIMs, stuck one in, reconnected and clicked “Crack” and then start.

I left it running in the background after the manual suggested it could take up to 24 hours to run through all the codes.

To my surprise after 2 minutes the software was requesting I save the exported data, which I did.

Then I put the 16 in 1 back in, selected Magic and then imported the cracked SIM data (IMSI, ICCID, Ki & SMSp).

By the looks of it the software is just running a brute force attack on the SIM card, and the keyspace is only so large meaning it can be reversed in.

I did a bit of research to find out if this is exploiting any clever vulnerabilities in UCCID cards, but after running some USB Pcap traces it looks like it’s just plain old brute force, which could be easily defended against by putting a pause between auth attempts on the SIM.

I’ve no idea if that’s the actual K value I extracted from the SIM – The operator that issued the SIM doesn’t even exist anymore, but I’ll add the details to the HLR of my Osmocom GSM lab and see if it matches up.

Out of curiosity I also connected some of my development USIM/ISIM/SIM cards that I can program, the software is amazing in it’s response:

VoLTE Logo on Samsung Galaxy Handset

Things I wish I knew about setting up private VoLTE Networks

I’ve been working for some time on open source mobile network cores, and one feature that has been a real struggle for a lot of people (Myself included) is getting VoLTE / IMS working.

Here’s some of the issues I’ve faced, and the lessons I learned along the way,

Sadly on most UEs / handsets, there’s no “Make VoLTE work now” switch, you’ve got a satisfy a bunch of dependencies in the OS before the baseband will start sending SIP anywhere.

Get the right Hardware

Your eNB must support additional bearers (dedicated bearers I’ve managed to get away without in my testing) so the device can setup an APN for the IMS traffic.

Sadly at the moment this rules our Software Defined eNodeBs, like srsENB.

In the end I opted for a commercial eNB which has support for dedicated bearers.

ISIM – When you thought you understood USIMs – Guess again

According to the 3GPP IMS docs, an ISIM (IMS SIM) is not a requirement for IMS to work.

However in my testing I found Android didn’t have the option to enable VoLTE unless an ISIM was present the first time.

In a weird quirk I found once I’d inserted an ISIM and connected to the VoLTE network, I could put a USIM in the UE and also connect to the VoLTE network.

Obviously the parameters you can set on the USIM, such as Domain, IMPU, IMPI & AD, are kind of “guessed” but the AKAv1-MD5 algorithm does run.

Getting the APN Config Right

There’s a lot of things you’ll need to have correct on your UE before it’ll even start to think about sending SIP messaging.

I was using commercial UE (Samsung handsets) without engineering firmware so I had very limited info on what’s going on “under the hood”. There’s no “Make VoLTE do” tickbox, there’s VoLTE enable, but that won’t do anything by default.

In the end I found adding a new APN called ims with type ims and enabling VoLTE in the settings finally saw the UE setup an IMS dedicated bearer, and request the P-CSCF address in the Protocol Configuration Options.

Also keep in mind on Android at least, what you specify as your APN might be ignored if your UE thinks it knows best – Thanks to the Android Master APN Config – which guesses the best APN for you to use, which is a useful feature to almost any Android user, except the very small number who see fit to setup their own network.

Get the P-GW your P-CSCF Address

If your P-GW doesn’t know the IP of your P-CSCF, it’s not going to be able to respond to it in the Protocol Configuration Options (PCO) request sent by the UE with that nice new bearer for IMS we just setup.

There’s no way around Mutual Authentication

Coming from a voice background, and pretty much having RFC 3261 tattooed on my brain, when I finally got the SIP REGISTER request sent to the Proxy CSCF I knocked something up in Kamailio to send back a 200 OK, thinking that’d be the end of it.

For any other SIP endpoint this would have been fine, but IMS Clients, nope.

Reading the specs drove home the same lesson anyone attempting to setup their own LTE network quickly learns – Mutual authentication means both the network and the UE need to verify each other, while I (as the network) can say the UE is OK, the UE needs to check I’m on the level.

For anyone not familiar with the intricacies of 3GPP USIM Network Authentication, I’ve written about Mutual Network Authentication in this post.

In the end I added Multimedia Authentication support to PyHSS, and responded with a Crypto challenge using the AKAv1-MD5 auth,

For anyone curious about what goes on under the hood with this, I wrote about how the AKAv1-MD5 Authentication algorithm works in this post,

I saw my 401 response go back to the UE and then no response. Nada.

This led to my next lesson…

There’s no way around IPsec

According to the 3GPP docs, support for IPsec is optional, but I found this not to be the case on the handsets I’ve tested.

After sending back my 401 response the UE looks for the IPsec info in the 401 response, then tries to setup an IPsec SA and sends ESP packets back to the P-CSCF address.

Even with my valid AKAv1-MD5 auth, I found my UE wasn’t responding until I added IPsec support on the P-CSCF, hence why I couldn’t see the second REGISTER with the Authentication Info.

After setting up IPsec support, I finally saw the UE’s REGISTER with the AKAv1-MD5 authentication, and was able to send a 200 OK.

For some more info on ESP, IPsec SAs and how it works between the UE and the P-CSCF there’s a post on that too.

Get Good at Mind Reading (Or an Engineering Firmware)

To learn all these lessons took a long time,

One thing I worked out a bit late but would have been invaluable was cracking into the Engineering Debug options on the UEs I was testing with.

Samsung UEs feature a Sysdump utility that has an IMS Debugging tool, sadly it’s only their for carriers doing IMS interop testing.

After a bit of work I detailed in this post – Reverse Engineering Samsung Sysdump Utils to Unlock IMS Debug & TCPdump on Samsung Phones – I managed to create a One-Time-Password generator for this to generate valid Samsung OTP keys to unlock the IMS Debugging feature on these handsets.

I outlined turning on these features in this post.

This means without engineering firmware you’re able to pull a bunch of debugging info off the UE.

If you’ve recently gone through this, are going through this or thinking about it, I’d love to hear your experiences.

I’ll be continuing to share my adventures here and elsewhere to help others get their own VoLTE networks happening.

If you’re leaning about VoLTE & IMS networks, or building your own, I’d suggest checking out my other posts on the topic.

VoLTE / IMS – P-CSCF Assignment

The Proxy-Call Session Control Function is the first network element a UE sends it’s SIP REGISTER message to, but how does it get there?

To begin with our UE connects as it would normally, getting a default bearer, an IP address and connectivity.

Overview

If the USIM has an ISIM application on it (or IMS is enabled on the UE using USIM for auth) and an IMS APN exists on the UE for IMS, the UE will set up another bearer in addition to the default bearer.

This bearer will carry our IMS traffic and allow QoS to be managed through the QCI values set on the bearer.

While setting up the bearer the UE requests certain parameters from the network in the Protocol Configuration Options element, including the P-CSCF address.

When setting up the bearer the network responds with this information, which if supported includes the P-CSCF IPv4 &/or IPv6 addresses.

The Message Exchange

We’ll start assuming the default bearer is in place & our UE is configured with the APN for IMS and supports IMS functionality.

The first step is to begin the establishment of an additional bearer for the IMS traffic.

This is kicked off through the Uplink NAS Transport, PDN Connectivity Request from the UE to the network. This includes the IMS APN information, and the UE’s NAS Payload includes the Protocol Configuration Options element (PCO), with a series of fields the UE requires responses from the network. including DNS Server, MTU, etc.

In the PCO the UE also includes the P-CSCF address request, so the network can tell the UE the IP of the P-CSCF to use.

If this is missing it’s because either your APN settings for IMS are not valid, or your device doesn’t have IMS support or isn’t enabling it.(that could be for a few reasons).

Protocol Configuration Options (Unpopulated) used to request information from the Network by the UE

The MME gets this information from the P-GW, and the network responds in the E-RAB Setup Request, Activate default EPS bearer Context Request and includes the Protocol Configuration Options again, this time the fields are populated with their respective values, including the P-CSCF Address;

Once the UE has this setup, the eNB confirms it’s setup the radio resources through the E-RAB Setup Response.

One the eNB has put the radio side of things in place, the UE confirms the bearer assignment has completed successfully through the Uplink NAS Transport, Activate default EPS Bearer Accept, denoting the bearer is now in place.

Now the UE has the IP address(s) of the P-CSCF and a bearer to send it over, the UE establishes a TCP socket with the address specified in the P-CSCF IPv4 or IPv6 address, to start communicating with the P-CSCF.

The SIP REGISTER request can now be sent and the REGISTRATION procedure can begin.

I’ve attached a PCAP of the full exchange here.

I’ve written a bit about the Gm REGISTER procedure and how IPsec is implemented between the UE and the P-CSCF in this post.

If you’re leaning about VoLTE & IMS networks, or building your own, I’d suggest checking out my other posts on the topic.

PyHSS Update – IMS Cx Support!

As I’ve been doing more and more work with IMS / VoLTE, the requirements / features on PyHSS has grown.

Some key features I’ve added recently:

IMS HSS Features

IMS Cx Server Assignment Request / Answer

IMS Cx Multimedia Authentication Request / Answer

IMS Cx User Authentication Request / Answer

IMS Cx Location Information Request / Answer

General HSS Features

Better logging (IPs instead of Diameter hostnames)

Better Resync Support (For USIMs with different sync windows)

ToDo

There’s still some functions in the 3GPP Cx interface description I need to implement:

IMS Cx Registration-Termination Request / Answer

IMS Cx Push-Profile-Request / Answer

Support for Resync in IMS Cx Multimedia Authentication Answer

Keep an eye on the GitLab repo where I’m pushing the changes.

If you’re leaning about VoLTE & IMS networks, or building your own, I’d suggest checking out my other posts on the topic.

Kamailio Bytes – Configuring Diameter Peers with CDP

I’ve talked a little about my adventures with Diameter in the past, the basics of Diameter, the packet structure and the Python HSS I put together.

Kamailio is generally thought of as a SIP router, but it can in fact handle Diameter signaling as well.

Everything to do with Diameter in Kamailio relies on the C Diameter Peer and CDP_AVP modules which abstract the handling of Diameter messages, and allow us to handle them sort of like SIP messages.

CDP on it’s own doesn’t actually allow us to send Diameter messages, but it’s relied upon by other modules, like CDP_AVP and many of the Kamailio IMS modules, to handle Diameter signaling.

Before we can start shooting Diameter messages all over the place we’ve first got to configure our Kamailio instance, to bring up other Diameter peers, and learn about their capabilities.

C Diameter Peer (Aka CDP) manages the Diameter connections, the Device Watchdog Request/Answers etc, all in the background.

We’ll need to define our Diameter peers for CDP to use so Kamailio can talk to them. This is done in an XML file which lays out our Diameter peers and all the connection information.

In our Kamailio config we’ll add the following lines:

loadmodule "cdp.so"
modparam("cdp", "config_file", "/etc/kamailio/diametercfg.xml")
loadmodule "cdp_avp.so"

This will load the CDP modules and instruct Kamailio to pull it’s CDP info from an XML config file at /etc/kamailio/diametercfg.xml

Let’s look at the basic example given when installed:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- 

 DiameterPeer Parameters 
  - FQDN - FQDN of this peer, as it should apper in the Origin-Host AVP
  - Realm - Realm of this peer, as it should apper in the Origin-Realm AVP
  - Vendor_Id - Default Vendor-Id to appear in the Capabilities Exchange
  - Product_Name - Product Name to appear in the Capabilities Exchange 
  - AcceptUnknownPeers - Whether to accept (1) or deny (0) connections from peers with FQDN 
    not configured below
  - DropUnknownOnDisconnect - Whether to drop (1) or keep (0) and retry connections (until restart)
    unknown peers in the list of peers after a disconnection.
  - Tc - Value for the RFC3588 Tc timer - default 30 seconds
  - Workers - Number of incoming messages processing workers forked processes.
  - Queue - Length of queue of tasks for the workers:
     - too small and the incoming messages will be blocked too often;
     - too large and the senders of incoming messages will have a longer feedback loop to notice that
     this Diameter peer is overloaded in processing incoming requests;
     - a good choice is to have it about 2 times the number of workers. This will mean that each worker
     will have about 2 tasks in the queue to process before new incoming messages will start to block.
  - ConnectTimeout - time in seconds to wait for an outbound TCP connection to be established.
  - TransactionTimeout - time in seconds after which the transaction timeout callback will be fired,
    when using transactional processing.
  - SessionsHashSize - size of the hash-table to use for the Diameter sessions. When searching for a 
    session, the time required for this operation will be that of sequential searching in a list of 
    NumberOfActiveSessions/SessionsHashSize. So higher the better, yet each hashslot will consume an
    extra 2xsizeof(void*) bytes (typically 8 or 16 bytes extra).
  - DefaultAuthSessionTimeout - default value to use when there is no Authorization Session Timeout 
  AVP present.
  - MaxAuthSessionTimeout - maximum Authorization Session Timeout as a cut-out measure meant to
  enforce session refreshes.
      
 -->
<DiameterPeer 
        FQDN="pcscf.ims.smilecoms.com"
        Realm="ims.smilecoms.com"
        Vendor_Id="10415"
        Product_Name="CDiameterPeer"
        AcceptUnknownPeers="0"
        DropUnknownOnDisconnect="1"
        Tc="30"
        Workers="4"
        QueueLength="32"
        ConnectTimeout="5"
        TransactionTimeout="5"
        SessionsHashSize="128"
        DefaultAuthSessionTimeout="60"
        MaxAuthSessionTimeout="300"
>

        <!--
                Definition of peers to connect to and accept connections from. For each peer found in here
                a dedicated receiver process will be forked. All other unkwnown peers will share a single
                receiver. NB: You must have a peer definition for each peer listed in the realm routing section
        -->
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf1.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf2.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf3.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf4.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf5.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
        <Peer FQDN="pcrf6.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>

        <!--
                Definition of incoming connection acceptors. If no bind is specified, the acceptor will bind
                on all available interfaces.
        -->
        <Acceptor port="3868"  />
        <Acceptor port="3869" bind="127.0.0.1" />
        <Acceptor port="3870" bind="192.168.1.1" />

        <!--
                Definition of Auth (authorization) and Acct (accounting) supported applications. This
                information is sent as part of the Capabilities Exchange procedures on connecting to
                peers. If no common application is found, the peers will disconnect. Messages will only
                be sent to a peer if that peer actually has declared support for the application id of 
                the message.
        -->
        <Acct id="16777216" vendor="10415" />
        <Acct id="16777216" vendor="0" />
        <Auth id="16777216" vendor="10415"/>
        <Auth id="16777216" vendor="0" />

        <!-- 
                Supported Vendor IDs - list of values which will be sent in the CER/CEA in the
                Supported-Vendor-ID AVPs
        -->
        <SupportedVendor vendor="10415" />

        <!--
                Realm routing definition.
                Each Realm can have a different table of peers to route towards. In case the Destination
                Realm AVP contains a Realm not defined here, the DefaultRoute entries will be used.

                Note: In case a message already contains a Destination-Host AVP, Realm Routeing will not be
                applied.
                Note: Routing will only happen towards connected and application id supporting peers.
                
                The metric is used to order the list of prefered peers, while looking for a connected and
                application id supporting peer. In the end, of course, just one peer will be selected.
        -->
        <Realm name="ims.smilecoms.com">
                <Route FQDN="pcrf1.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="3"/>
                <Route FQDN="pcrf2.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="5"/>
        </Realm>

        <Realm name="temp.ims.smilecoms.com">
                <Route FQDN="pcrf3.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="7"/>
                <Route FQDN="pcrf4.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="11"/>
        </Realm>
        <DefaultRoute FQDN="pcrf5.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="15"/>
        <DefaultRoute FQDN="pcrf6.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="13"/>


</DiameterPeer>

First we need to start by telling CDP about the Diameter peer it’s going to be – we do this in the <DiameterPeer section where we define the FQDN and Diameter Realm we’re going to use, as well as some general configuration parameters.

<Peers are of course, Diameter peers. Defining them here will mean a connection is established to each one, Capabilities exchanged and Watchdog request/responses managed. We define the usage of each Peer further on in the config.

The Acceptor section – fairly obviously – sets the bindings for the addresses and ports we’ll listen on.

Next up we need to define the Diameter applications we support in the <Acct id=” /> and <SupportedVendor> parameters, this can be a little unintuitive as we could list support for every Diameter application here, but unless you’ve got a module that can handle those applications, it’s of no use.

Instead of using Dispatcher to manage sending Diameter requests, CDP handles this for us. CDP keeps track of the Peers status and it’s capabilities, but we can group like Peers together, for example we may have a pool of PCRF NEs, so we can group them together into a <Realm >. Instead of calling a peer directly we can call the realm and CDP will dispatch the request to an up peer inside the realm, similar to Dispatcher Groups.

Finally we can configure a <DefaultRoute> which will be used if we don’t specify the peer or realm the request needs to be sent to. Multiple default routes can exist, differentiated based on preference.

We can check the status of peers using Kamcmd’s cdp.list_peers command which lists the peers, their states and capabilities.

PLMN Identity from Wireshark in Hex Form

PLMN Identifier Calculation (MCC & MNC to PLMN)

Note: This didn’t handle 3 digit MNCs, an updated version is available here and in the code sample below.

The PLMN Identifier is used to identify the radio networks in use, it’s made up of the MCC – Mobile Country Code and MNC – Mobile Network Code.

But sadly it’s not as simple as just concatenating MCC and MNC like in the IMSI, there’s a bit more to it.

In the example above the Tracking Area Identity includes the PLMN Identity, and Wireshark has been kind enough to split it out into MCC and MNC, but how does it get that from the value 12f410?

This one took me longer to work out than I’d like to admit, and saw me looking through the GSM spec, but here goes:

PLMN Contents: Mobile Country Code (MCC) followed by the Mobile Network Code (MNC).
Coding: according to TS GSM 04.08 [14].

If storage for fewer than the maximum possible number n is required, the excess bytes shall be set to ‘FF’. For instance, using 246 for the MCC and 81 for the MNC and if this is the first and only PLMN, the contents reads as follows: Bytes 1-3: ’42’ ‘F6′ ’18’ Bytes 4-6: ‘FF’ ‘FF’ ‘FF’ etc.

TS GSM 04.08 [14].

Making sense to you now? Me neither.

Here’s the Python code I wrote to encode MCC and MNCs to PLMN Identifiers and to decode PLMN into MCC and MNC, and then we’ll talk about what’s happening:

def Reverse(str):
    stringlength=len(str)
    slicedString=str[stringlength::-1]
    return (slicedString)    

def DecodePLMN(plmn):
    print("Decoding PLMN: " + str(plmn))
    
    if "f" in plmn:
        mcc = Reverse(plmn[0:2]) + Reverse(plmn[2:4]).replace('f', '')
        print("Decoded MCC: " + str(mcc))
        mnc = Reverse(plmn[4:6])
    else:
        mcc = Reverse(plmn[0:2]) + Reverse(plmn[2:4][1])
        print("Decoded MCC: " + str(mcc))
        mnc = Reverse(plmn[4:6]) + str(Reverse(plmn[2:4][0]))
    print("Decoded MNC: " + str(mnc))
    return mcc, mnc

def EncodePLMN(mcc, mnc):
        plmn = list('XXXXXX')
        if len(mnc) == 2:
            plmn[0] = Reverse(mcc)[1]
            plmn[1] = Reverse(mcc)[2]
            plmn[2] = "f"
            plmn[3] = Reverse(mcc)[0]
            plmn[4] = Reverse(mnc)[0]
            plmn[5] = Reverse(mnc)[1]
            plmn_list = plmn
            plmn = ''
        else:
            plmn[0] = Reverse(mcc)[1]
            plmn[1] = Reverse(mcc)[2]
            plmn[2] = Reverse(mnc)[0]
            plmn[3] = Reverse(mcc)[0]
            plmn[4] = Reverse(mnc)[1]
            plmn[5] = Reverse(mnc)[2]
            plmn_list = plmn
            plmn = ''
        for bits in plmn_list:
            plmn = plmn + bits
        print("Encoded PLMN: " + str(plmn))
        return plmn

EncodePLMN('505', '93')
EncodePLMN('310', '410')

DecodePLMN("05f539")
DecodePLMN("130014")

In the above example I take MCC 505 (Australia) and MCC 93 and generate the PLMN ID 05f539.

The first step in decoding is to take the first two bits (in our case 05 and reverse them – 50, then we take the third and fourth bits (f5) and reverse them too, and strip the letter f, now we have just 5. We join that with what we had earlier and there’s our MCC – 505.

Next we get our MNC, for this we take bytes 5 & 6 (39) and reverse them, and there’s our MNC – 93.

Together we’ve got MCC 505 and MNC 93.

The one answer I’m still looking for; why not just encode 50593? What is gained by encoding it as 05f539?