I had a few headaches getting the example P-CSCF example configs from the Kamailio team to run, recent improvements with the IPsec support and code evolution meant that the example config just didn’t run.
So, after finally working out the changes I needed to make to get Kamailio to function as a P-CSCF, I took the plunge and made my first pull request on the Kamailio project.
I’ve been working for some time on open source mobile network cores, and one feature that has been a real struggle for a lot of people (Myself included) is getting VoLTE / IMS working.
Here’s some of the issues I’ve faced, and the lessons I learned along the way,
Sadly on most UEs / handsets, there’s no “Make VoLTE work now” switch, you’ve got a satisfy a bunch of dependencies in the OS before the baseband will start sending SIP anywhere.
Get the right Hardware
Your eNB must support additional bearers (dedicated bearers I’ve managed to get away without in my testing) so the device can setup an APN for the IMS traffic.
Sadly at the moment this rules our Software Defined eNodeBs, like srsENB.
ISIM – When you thought you understood USIMs – Guess again
According to the 3GPP IMS docs, an ISIM (IMS SIM) is not a requirement for IMS to work.
However in my testing I found Android didn’t have the option to enable VoLTE unless an ISIM was present the first time.
In a weird quirk I found once I’d inserted an ISIM and connected to the VoLTE network, I could put a USIM in the UE and also connect to the VoLTE network.
Obviously the parameters you can set on the USIM, such as Domain, IMPU, IMPI & AD, are kind of “guessed” but the AKAv1-MD5 algorithm does run.
Getting the APN Config Right
There’s a lot of things you’ll need to have correct on your UE before it’ll even start to think about sending SIP messaging.
I was using commercial UE (Samsung handsets) without engineering firmware so I had very limited info on what’s going on “under the hood”. There’s no “Make VoLTE do” tickbox, there’s VoLTE enable, but that won’t do anything by default.
If your P-GW doesn’t know the IP of your P-CSCF, it’s not going to be able to respond to it in the Protocol Configuration Options (PCO) request sent by the UE with that nice new bearer for IMS we just setup.
There’s no way around Mutual Authentication
Coming from a voice background, and pretty much having RFC 3261 tattooed on my brain, when I finally got the SIP REGISTER request sent to the Proxy CSCF I knocked something up in Kamailio to send back a 200 OK, thinking that’d be the end of it.
For any other SIP endpoint this would have been fine, but IMS Clients, nope.
Reading the specs drove home the same lesson anyone attempting to setup their own LTE network quickly learns – Mutual authentication means both the network and the UE need to verify each other, while I (as the network) can say the UE is OK, the UE needs to check I’m on the level.
I saw my 401 response go back to the UE and then no response. Nada.
This led to my next lesson…
There’s no way around IPsec
According to the 3GPP docs, support for IPsec is optional, but I found this not to be the case on the handsets I’ve tested.
After sending back my 401 response the UE looks for the IPsec info in the 401 response, then tries to setup an IPsec SA and sends ESP packets back to the P-CSCF address.
Even with my valid AKAv1-MD5 auth, I found my UE wasn’t responding until I added IPsec support on the P-CSCF, hence why I couldn’t see the second REGISTER with the Authentication Info.
After setting up IPsec support, I finally saw the UE’s REGISTER with the AKAv1-MD5 authentication, and was able to send a 200 OK.
The Proxy-Call Session Control Function is the first network element a UE sends it’s SIP REGISTER message to, but how does it get there?
To begin with our UE connects as it would normally, getting a default bearer, an IP address and connectivity.
Overview
If the USIM has an ISIM application on it (or IMS is enabled on the UE using USIM for auth) and an IMS APN exists on the UE for IMS, the UE will set up another bearer in addition to the default bearer.
This bearer will carry our IMS traffic and allow QoS to be managed through the QCI values set on the bearer.
While setting up the bearer the UE requests certain parameters from the network in the Protocol Configuration Options element, including the P-CSCF address.
When setting up the bearer the network responds with this information, which if supported includes the P-CSCF IPv4 &/or IPv6 addresses.
The Message Exchange
We’ll start assuming the default bearer is in place & our UE is configured with the APN for IMS and supports IMS functionality.
The first step is to begin the establishment of an additional bearer for the IMS traffic.
This is kicked off through the Uplink NAS Transport, PDN Connectivity Request from the UE to the network. This includes the IMS APN information, and the UE’s NAS Payload includes the Protocol Configuration Options element (PCO), with a series of fields the UE requires responses from the network. including DNS Server, MTU, etc.
In the PCO the UE also includes the P-CSCF address request, so the network can tell the UE the IP of the P-CSCF to use.
If this is missing it’s because either your APN settings for IMS are not valid, or your device doesn’t have IMS support or isn’t enabling it.(that could be for a few reasons).
Protocol Configuration Options (Unpopulated) used to request information from the Network by the UE
The MME gets this information from the P-GW, and the network responds in the E-RAB Setup Request, Activate default EPS bearer Context Request and includes the Protocol Configuration Options again, this time the fields are populated with their respective values, including the P-CSCF Address;
Once the UE has this setup, the eNB confirms it’s setup the radio resources through the E-RAB Setup Response.
One the eNB has put the radio side of things in place, the UE confirms the bearer assignment has completed successfully through the Uplink NAS Transport, Activate default EPS Bearer Accept, denoting the bearer is now in place.
Now the UE has the IP address(s) of the P-CSCF and a bearer to send it over, the UE establishes a TCP socket with the address specified in the P-CSCF IPv4 or IPv6 address, to start communicating with the P-CSCF.
The SIP REGISTER request can now be sent and the REGISTRATION procedure can begin.
For most Voice / Telco engineers IPsec is a VPN technology, maybe something used when backhauling over an untrusted link, etc, but voice over IP traffic is typically secured with TLS and SRTP.
IMS / Voice over LTE handles things a bit differently, it encapsulates the SIP & RTP traffic between the UE and the P-CSCF in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) payloads.
In this post we’ll take a look at how it works and what it looks like.
It’s worth noting that Kamailio recently added support for IPsec encapsulation on a P-CSCF, in the IMS IPSec-Register module. I’ll cover usage of this at a later date.
The Message Exchange
The exchange starts off looking like any other SIP Registration session, in this case using TCP for transport. The UE sends a REGISTER to the Proxy-CSCF which eventually forwards the request through to a Serving-CSCF.
This is where we diverge from the standard SIP REGISTER message exchange. The Serving-CSCF generates a 401 Unauthorized response, containing an authentication challenge in the WWW-Authenticate header, and also a Ciphering Key & Integrity Key (ck= and ik=) also in the WWW-Authenticate header.
The Serving-CSCF sends the Proxy-CSCF the 401 response it created. The Proxy-CSCF assigns a SPI for the IPsec ESP to use, a server port and client port and indicates the used encryption algorithm (ealg) and algorithm to use (In this case HMAC-SHA-1-96.) and adds a new header to the 401 Unauthorized called Security–Server header to share this information with the UE.
The Proxy-CSCF also strips the Ciphering Key (ck=) and Integrity Key (ik=) headers from the SIP authentication challenge (WWW-Auth) and uses them as the ciphering and integrity keys for the IPsec connection.
Finally after setting up the IPsec server side of things, it forwards the 401 Unauthorized response onto the UE.
Upon receipt of the 401 response, the UE looks at the authentication challenge.
If the network is considered authenticated by the UE it generates a response to the Authentication Challenge, but it doesn’t deliver it over TCP. Using the information generated in the authentication challenge the UE encapsulates everything from the network layer (IPv4) up and sends it to the P-CSCF in an IPsec ESP.
Communication between the UE and the P-CSCF is now encapsulated in IPsec.
Wireshark trace of IPsec IMS Traffic between UE and P-CSCF
IPsec ESP can be used in 3 different ways on the Gm interface between the Ue and the P-CSCF:
Integrity Protection – To prevent tampering
Ciphering – To prevent inception / eavesdropping
Integrity Protection & Ciphering
On Wireshark, you’ll see the ESP, but you won’t see the payload contents, just the fact it’s an Encapsulated Security Payload, it’s SPI and Sequence number.
By default, Kamailio’s P-CSCF only acts in Integrity Protection mode, meaning the ESP payloads aren’t actually encrypted, with a few clicks we can get Wireshark to decode this data;
Just open up Wireshark Preferences, expand Protocols and jump to ESP
Now we can set the decoding preferences for our ESP payloads,
In our case we’ll tick the “Attempt to detect/decode NULL encrypted ESP payloads” box and close the box by clicking OK button.
Now Wireshark will scan through all the frames again, anything that’s an ESP payload it will attempt to parse.
Now if we go back to the ESP payload with SQN 1 I showed a screenshot of earlier, we can see the contents are a TCP SYN.
Now we can see what’s going on inside this ESP data between the P-CSCF and the UE!
As a matter of interest if you can see the IK and CK values in the 401 response before they’re stripped you can decode encrypted ESP payloads from Wireshark, from the same Protocol -> ESP section you can load the Ciphering and Integrity keys used in that session to decrypt them.
Kamailio is generally thought of as a SIP router, but it can in fact handle Diameter signaling as well.
Everything to do with Diameter in Kamailio relies on the C Diameter Peer and CDP_AVP modules which abstract the handling of Diameter messages, and allow us to handle them sort of like SIP messages.
CDP on it’s own doesn’t actually allow us to send Diameter messages, but it’s relied upon by other modules, like CDP_AVP and many of the Kamailio IMS modules, to handle Diameter signaling.
Before we can start shooting Diameter messages all over the place we’ve first got to configure our Kamailio instance, to bring up other Diameter peers, and learn about their capabilities.
C Diameter Peer (Aka CDP) manages the Diameter connections, the Device Watchdog Request/Answers etc, all in the background.
We’ll need to define our Diameter peers for CDP to use so Kamailio can talk to them. This is done in an XML file which lays out our Diameter peers and all the connection information.
In our Kamailio config we’ll add the following lines:
This will load the CDP modules and instruct Kamailio to pull it’s CDP info from an XML config file at /etc/kamailio/diametercfg.xml
Let’s look at the basic example given when installed:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!--
DiameterPeer Parameters
- FQDN - FQDN of this peer, as it should apper in the Origin-Host AVP
- Realm - Realm of this peer, as it should apper in the Origin-Realm AVP
- Vendor_Id - Default Vendor-Id to appear in the Capabilities Exchange
- Product_Name - Product Name to appear in the Capabilities Exchange
- AcceptUnknownPeers - Whether to accept (1) or deny (0) connections from peers with FQDN
not configured below
- DropUnknownOnDisconnect - Whether to drop (1) or keep (0) and retry connections (until restart)
unknown peers in the list of peers after a disconnection.
- Tc - Value for the RFC3588 Tc timer - default 30 seconds
- Workers - Number of incoming messages processing workers forked processes.
- Queue - Length of queue of tasks for the workers:
- too small and the incoming messages will be blocked too often;
- too large and the senders of incoming messages will have a longer feedback loop to notice that
this Diameter peer is overloaded in processing incoming requests;
- a good choice is to have it about 2 times the number of workers. This will mean that each worker
will have about 2 tasks in the queue to process before new incoming messages will start to block.
- ConnectTimeout - time in seconds to wait for an outbound TCP connection to be established.
- TransactionTimeout - time in seconds after which the transaction timeout callback will be fired,
when using transactional processing.
- SessionsHashSize - size of the hash-table to use for the Diameter sessions. When searching for a
session, the time required for this operation will be that of sequential searching in a list of
NumberOfActiveSessions/SessionsHashSize. So higher the better, yet each hashslot will consume an
extra 2xsizeof(void*) bytes (typically 8 or 16 bytes extra).
- DefaultAuthSessionTimeout - default value to use when there is no Authorization Session Timeout
AVP present.
- MaxAuthSessionTimeout - maximum Authorization Session Timeout as a cut-out measure meant to
enforce session refreshes.
-->
<DiameterPeer
FQDN="pcscf.ims.smilecoms.com"
Realm="ims.smilecoms.com"
Vendor_Id="10415"
Product_Name="CDiameterPeer"
AcceptUnknownPeers="0"
DropUnknownOnDisconnect="1"
Tc="30"
Workers="4"
QueueLength="32"
ConnectTimeout="5"
TransactionTimeout="5"
SessionsHashSize="128"
DefaultAuthSessionTimeout="60"
MaxAuthSessionTimeout="300"
>
<!--
Definition of peers to connect to and accept connections from. For each peer found in here
a dedicated receiver process will be forked. All other unkwnown peers will share a single
receiver. NB: You must have a peer definition for each peer listed in the realm routing section
-->
<Peer FQDN="pcrf1.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<Peer FQDN="pcrf2.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<Peer FQDN="pcrf3.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<Peer FQDN="pcrf4.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<Peer FQDN="pcrf5.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<Peer FQDN="pcrf6.ims.smilecoms.com" Realm="ims.smilecoms.com" port="3868"/>
<!--
Definition of incoming connection acceptors. If no bind is specified, the acceptor will bind
on all available interfaces.
-->
<Acceptor port="3868" />
<Acceptor port="3869" bind="127.0.0.1" />
<Acceptor port="3870" bind="192.168.1.1" />
<!--
Definition of Auth (authorization) and Acct (accounting) supported applications. This
information is sent as part of the Capabilities Exchange procedures on connecting to
peers. If no common application is found, the peers will disconnect. Messages will only
be sent to a peer if that peer actually has declared support for the application id of
the message.
-->
<Acct id="16777216" vendor="10415" />
<Acct id="16777216" vendor="0" />
<Auth id="16777216" vendor="10415"/>
<Auth id="16777216" vendor="0" />
<!--
Supported Vendor IDs - list of values which will be sent in the CER/CEA in the
Supported-Vendor-ID AVPs
-->
<SupportedVendor vendor="10415" />
<!--
Realm routing definition.
Each Realm can have a different table of peers to route towards. In case the Destination
Realm AVP contains a Realm not defined here, the DefaultRoute entries will be used.
Note: In case a message already contains a Destination-Host AVP, Realm Routeing will not be
applied.
Note: Routing will only happen towards connected and application id supporting peers.
The metric is used to order the list of prefered peers, while looking for a connected and
application id supporting peer. In the end, of course, just one peer will be selected.
-->
<Realm name="ims.smilecoms.com">
<Route FQDN="pcrf1.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="3"/>
<Route FQDN="pcrf2.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="5"/>
</Realm>
<Realm name="temp.ims.smilecoms.com">
<Route FQDN="pcrf3.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="7"/>
<Route FQDN="pcrf4.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="11"/>
</Realm>
<DefaultRoute FQDN="pcrf5.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="15"/>
<DefaultRoute FQDN="pcrf6.ims.smilecoms.com" metric="13"/>
</DiameterPeer>
First we need to start by telling CDP about the Diameter peer it’s going to be – we do this in the <DiameterPeer section where we define the FQDN and Diameter Realm we’re going to use, as well as some general configuration parameters.
<Peers are of course, Diameter peers. Defining them here will mean a connection is established to each one, Capabilities exchanged and Watchdog request/responses managed. We define the usage of each Peer further on in the config.
The Acceptor section – fairly obviously – sets the bindings for the addresses and ports we’ll listen on.
Next up we need to define the Diameter applications we support in the <Acct id=” /> and <SupportedVendor> parameters, this can be a little unintuitive as we could list support for every Diameter application here, but unless you’ve got a module that can handle those applications, it’s of no use.
Instead of using Dispatcher to manage sending Diameter requests, CDP handles this for us. CDP keeps track of the Peers status and it’s capabilities, but we can group like Peers together, for example we may have a pool of PCRF NEs, so we can group them together into a <Realm >. Instead of calling a peer directly we can call the realm and CDP will dispatch the request to an up peer inside the realm, similar to Dispatcher Groups.
Finally we can configure a <DefaultRoute> which will be used if we don’t specify the peer or realm the request needs to be sent to. Multiple default routes can exist, differentiated based on preference.
We can check the status of peers using Kamcmd’s cdp.list_peers command which lists the peers, their states and capabilities.
While poking around the development and debugging features on Samsung handsets I found the ability to run IMS Debugging directly from the handset.
Alas, the option is only available in the commercial version, it’s just there for carriers, and requires a One Time Password to unlock.
When tapping on the option a challenge is generated with a key.
Interestingly I noticed that the key changes each time and can reject you even in aeroplane mode, suggesting the authentication happens client side.
This left me thinking – If the authentication happens client side, then the App has to know what the valid password for the key shown is…
Some research revealed you can pull APKs off an Android phone, so I downloaded a utility called “APK Extractor” from the Play store, and used it to extract the Samsung Sysdump utility.
So now I was armed with the APK on my local machine, the next step was to see if I could decompile the APK back into source code.
Some Googling found me an online APK decompiler, which I fed the compiled APK file and got back the source code.
I did some poking around inside the source code, and then I found an interesting directory:
Here’s a screenshot of the vanilla code that came out of the app.
I’m not a Java expert, but even I could see the “CheckOTP” function and understand that that’s what validates the One Time Passwords.
The while loop threw me a little – until I read through the rest of the code; the “key” in the popup box is actually a text string representing the current UNIX timestamp down to the minute level. The correct password is an operation done on the “key”, however the CheckOTP function doesn’t know the challenge key, but has the current time, so generates a challenge key for each timestamp back a few minutes and a few minutes into the future.
I modified the code slightly to allow me to enter the presented “key” and get the correct password back. It’s worth noting you need to act quickly, enter the “key” and enter the response within a minute or so.
In the end I’ve posted the code on an online Java compiler,
Samsung handsets have a feature built in to allow debugging from the handset, called Sysdump.
Entering *#9900# from the Dialing Screen will bring up the Sysdump App, from here you can dump logs from the device, and run a variety of debugging procedures.
But for private LTE operators, the two most interesting options are by far the TCPDUMP START option and IMS Logger, but both are grayed out.
Tapping on them asks for a one-time password and has a challenge key.
These options are not available in the commercial version of the OS and need to be unlocked with a one time key generated by a tool Samsung for unlocking engineering firmware on handsets.
Luckily this authentication happens client side, which means we can work out the password it’s expecting.
Once you’ve entered the code and successfully unlocked the IMS Debugging tool there’s a few really cool features in the hamburger menu in the top right.
DM View
This shows the SIP / IMS Messaging and the current signal strength parameters (used to determine which RAN type to use (Ie falling back from VoLTE to UMTS / Circuit Switched when the LTE signal strength drops).
Tapping on the SIP messages expands them and allows you to see the contents of the SIP messages.
Viewing SIP Messaging directly from the handset
Interesting the actual nitty-gritty parameters in the SIP headers are missing, replaced with X for anything “private” or identifiable.
Luckily all this info can be found in the Pcap.
The DM View is great for getting a quick look at what’s going on, on the mobile device itself, without needing a PC.
Logging
The real power comes in the logging functions,
There’s a lot of logging options, including screen recording, TCPdump (as in Packet Captures) and Syslog logging.
From the hamburger menu we can select the logging parameters we want to change.
From the Filter Options menu we can set what info we’re going to log,
I started working on a private LTE project a while ago; RAN hardware (eNodeBs) were on the way, down to a shortlist of a few EPC platforms, but I still needed USIMs before anyone was connecting to the network.
So why are custom USIMs a requirement? Can’t you just use any old USIM/SIMs?
For roaming to work between carriers they’ve got to have their HSS / DRA connecting to the DRA or HSS of other carriers, to allow roaming subscribers to access the network, otherwise they too would fall foul of the mutual network authentication and the USIM wouldn’t connect to the network.
The first USIMs I purchased online through a popular online marketplace with a focus on connecting you to Chinese manufacturers. They listed a package of USIMS, a USB reader/writer that supported all the standard USIM form factors and the software to program it, which I purchased.
The USIMs worked fairly well – They are programmable via a card reader and software that, although poorly translated/documented, worked fairly well.
USIM Programming Interface
K and OP/OPc values could be written to the card but not read, while the other values could be read and written from the software, the software also has the ability to sequentially program the USIMs to make bulk operations easier. The pricing worked out about $8 USD per USIM, which although expensive for the quantity and programmable element is pretty reasonable.
Every now and then the Crypto values for some reason or another wouldn’t get updated, which is exactly as irritating as it sounds.
Pretty quickly into the build I learned the USIMs didn’t include an ISIM service on the card, ISIM being the service that runs on the UCCID responsible for IMS / VoLTE authentication.
Again I went looking and reached out to a few manufacturers of USIMs.
The big vendors, Gemalto, Kona, etc, weren’t interested in providing USIMs in quantities less than 100,000 and their USIMs came from the factory pre-programmed, meaning the values could only be changed through remote SIM provisioning, a form of black magic.
In the end I reached out to an OEM manufacturer from China who provided programmable USIM / ISIMs for less than I was paying on the online marketplace and at any quantity I wanted with custom printing options, allocated ICCIDs, etc.
The non-programmable USIMs worked out less than $0.40 USD each in larger quantities, and programmable USIM/ISIMs for about $5 USD.
The software was almost identical except for the additional tab for ISIM operations.
USIM / ISIM programmingISIM parameters
Smart Card Readers
In theory this software and these USIMs could be programmed by any smart card reader.
In practice, the fact that the ISO standard smart card is the same size as a credit card, means most smart card readers won’t fit the bill.
I tried a few smart card readers, from the one built into my Thinkpad, to a Bluedrive II from one of the USIM vendors, in the end the MCR3516 Smart Card Reader which reads 4FF USIMs (Standard ISO size smart card, full size SIM, Micro SIM and Nano SIM form factors, which saved on so much mucking about with form factor adapters etc.
4FF Smart Card Reader for programming SIM/USIM/ISIM
Future Projects
I’ve got some very calls “Multi Operator Neutral Host” (MoNEH) USIMs from the guys at Telet Research I’m looking forward to playing with,
eSIMs are on my to-do list too, and the supporting infrastructure, as well as Over the Air updating of USIMs.
On a PCM (G.711) RTP packet the payload is typically 160 bytes per packet.
But the total size of the frame on the wire is typically ~214 bytes, to carry a 160 byte payload that means 25% of the data being carried is headers.
This is fine for VoIP services operating over fixed lines, but when we’re talking about VoLTE / IMS and the traffic is being transferred over Radio Access Networks with limited bandwidth / resources, it’s important to minimize this as much as possible.
IMS uses the AMR codec, where the RTP payload for each packet is around 90 bytes, meaning up to two thirds of the packet on the wire (Or in this case the air / Uu interface) is headers.
Using ROHC the size of the headers are cut down to only 4-5 bytes, this is because the IPv4 headers, UDP headers and RTP headers are typically the same in each packet – with only the RTP Sequence number, RTP timestamp IPv4 & UDP checksum and changing between frames.
As anyone who’s setup a private LTE network can generally attest, APNs can be a real headache.
SIM/USIM cards, don’t store any APN details. In this past you may remember having to plug all these settings into your new phone when you upgraded so you could get online again.
Today when you insert a USIM belonging to a commercial operator, you generally don’t need to put APN settings in, this is because Android OS has its own index of APNs. When the USIM is inserted into the baseband module, the handset’s OS looks at the MCC & MNC in the IMSI and gets the APN settings automatically from Android’s database of APN details.
There is an option for the network to send the connectivity details to the UE in a special type of SMS, but we won’t go into that.
All this info is stored on the Android OS in apns-full-conf.xml which for non-rooted (stock) devices is not editable.
This file can override the user’s APN configuration, which can lead to some really confusing times as your EPC rejects the connection due to an unrecognized APN which is not what you have configured on the UE’s operating system, but it instead uses APN details from it’s database.
The only way around this is to change the apns-full-conf.xml file, either by modifying it per handset or submitting a push request to Android Open Source with your updated settings.
(I’ve only tried the former with rooted devices)
The XML file itself is fairly self explanatory, taking the MCC and MNC and the APN details for your network:
Once you’ve added yours to the file, inserting the USIM, rebooting the handset or restarting the carrier app is all that’s required for it to be re-read and auto provision APN settings from the XML file.
I recently started working on an issue that I’d seen was to do with the HSS response to the MME on an Update Location Answer.
I took some Wireshark traces of a connection from the MME to the HSS, and compared that to a trace from a different HSS. (Amarisoft EPC/HSS)
The Update Location Answer sent by the Amarisoft HSS to the MME over the S6a (Diameter) interface includes an AVP for “Multiple APN Configuration” which has the the dedicated bearer for IMS, while the HSS in the software I was working on didn’t.
After a bit of bashing trying to modify the S6a responses, I decided I’d just implement my own Home Subscriber Server.
I recently began integrating IMS Authentication functions into PyHSS, and thought I’d share my notes / research into the authentication used by IMS networks & served by a IMS capable HSS.
There’s very little useful info online on AKAv1-MD5 algorithm, but it’s actually fairly simple to understand.
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is a method for authentication and key distribution in a EUTRAN network. AKA is challenge-response based using symmetric cryptography. AKA runs on the ISIM function of a USIM card.
The Nonce field is the Base64 encoded version of the RAND value and concatenated with the AUTN token from our AKA response. (Often called the Authentication Vectors).
That’s it!
It’s put in the SIP 401 response by the S-CSCF and sent to the UE. (Note, the Cyperhing Key & Integrity Keys are removed by the P-CSCF and used for IPsec SA establishment.
