Tag Archives: RAN

LTE (4G) – Authenticating the Network

EPC, LTE, Mobile Networks, RF, RFCs & Standards, Security, SIM Cards, , , ,

In my last post we discussed how the network authenticated a subscriber, now we’ll look at how a subscriber authenticates to a network. There’s a glaring issue there in that the MME could look at the RES and the XRES and just say “Yup, OK” even if the results differed.

To combat this LTE networks have mutual authentication, meaning the network authenticates the subscribers as we’ve discussed, and the subscribers authenticate the network.

To do this our HSS will take the same random key (RAND) we used to authenticate the subscriber, and using a different cryptographic function (called g) take the RAND, the K value and a sequence number called SQN, and using these 3 inputs, generate a new result we’ll call AUTN.

The HSS sends the RAND (same as RAND used to authenticate the subscriber) and the output of AUTN to the MME which forwards it to the eNB to the UE which passes the RAND and AUTH values to the USIM.

The USIM takes the RAND and the K value from the HSS, and it’s expected sequence number. With these 3 values it applies the cryptographic function g generates it’s own AUTN result.

If it matches the AUTN result generated by the HSS, the USIM has authenticated the network.

LTE (4G) – Authenticating Subscribers

EPC, LTE, Mobile Networks, RF, RFCs & Standards, SDM, SIM Cards, , , ,

The USIM and the HSS contain the subscriber’s K key. The K key is a 128 bit long key that is stored on the subscriber’s USIM and in the HSS along with the IMSI.

The terminal cannot read the K key, neither can the network, it is never transmitted / exposed.

When the Terminal starts the attach procedure, it includes it’s IMSI, which is sent to the MME.

The MME then sends the the HSS a copy of the IMSI.

The HSS looks up the K key for that IMSI, and generates a random key called RAND.

The HSS and runs a cryptographic function (called f) using the input of RAND and K key for that IMSI, the result is called XRES (Expected result).

The HSS sends the output of this cryptographic function (XRES), and the random value (RAND) back to the MME.

The MME forwards the RAND value to the USIM (via eNB / Terminal), and stores a copy of the expected output of the cryptographic function.

The USIM take the RAND and the K key and performs the same cryptographic function the HSS did on it with the input of the K key and RAND value to generate it’s own result (RES).

The result of this same function (RES) is then sent from the USIM to the terminal which forwards it to the MME.

The MME and comparing the result the HSS generated (XRES) with the result the USIM generated. (RES)

If the two match it means both the USIM knows the K key, and is therefore the subscriber they’re claiming to be.

If the two do not match the UE is refused access to the network.

Next up, how the UE authenticates the network.

LTE (4G) – USIM Basics

LTE, Mobile Networks, RF, RFCs & Standards, Security, SIM Cards, , , , , , , ,

I’ve been working on private LTE recently, and one of the first barriers you’ll hit will be authentication.

LTE doesn’t allow you to just use any SIM to authenticate to the network, but instead relies on mutual authentication of the UE and the network, so the Network knows it’s talking to the right UE and the UE knows it’s talking to the right network.

So because of this, you have to have full control over the SIM and the network. So let’s take a bit of a dive into USIMs.

So it’s a SIM card right?

As a bit of background; the ever shrinking card we all know as a SIM is a “Universal integrated circuit card” – a microcontroller with it’s own OS that generally has the ability to run Java applets.

One of the Java applets on the card / microcontroller will be the software stack for a SIM, used in GSM networks to authenticate the subscriber.

For UMTS and LTE networks the card would have a USIM software stack allowing it to act as a USIM, the evolved version of the SIM.

Because it’s just software a single card can run both a USIM and SIM software stack, and most do.

As I’m building an LTE network we’ll just talk about the USIM side of things.

USIM’s role in Authentication

When you fire up your mobile handset the baseband module in it communicates with the USIM application on the card.

When it comes time to authenticate to the network, and authenticate the network itself, the baseband module sends the provided challenge information from the network to the USIM which does the crypto magic to generate responses to the authentication challenges issued by the network, and the USIM issues it’s own challenges to the network.

The Baseband module provides the ingredients, but the USIM uses it’s secret recipe / ingredients combo, known only to the USIM and HSS, to perform the authentication.

Because the card challenges the network it means we’ve got mutual authentication of the network.

This prevents anyone from setting up their own radio network from going all Lionel Ritche and saying “Hello, is it me you’re looking for” and having all the UEs attach to the malicious network. (Something that could be done on GSM).

It’s worth noting too that because the USIM handles all this the baseband module, and therefore the mobile handset itself, doesn’t know any of the secret sauce used to negotiate with the network. It just gets the challenge and forwards the ingredients down to the USIM which spits back the correct response to send, without sharing the magic recipe.

This also means operators can implement their own Crypto functions for f and g, so long as the HSS and the USIM know how to generate the RES and AUTN results, it’ll work.

What’s Inside?

Let’s take a look at the information that’s stored on your USIM:

All the GSM stuff for legacy SIM application

Generally USIMs also have the ability to operate as SIMs in a GSM network, after all it’s just a different software stack. We won’t touch on GSM SIMs here.

ICCID

Because a USIM is just an application running on a Universal Integrated Circuit Card, it’s got a ICCID or Universal Integrated Circuit Card ID. Generally this is the long barcode / string of numbers printed on the card itself.

The network generally doesn’t care about this value, but operators may use it for logistics like shipping out cards.

PIN & PUK

PINs and PUKs are codes to unlock the card. If you get the PIN wrong too many times you need the longer PUK to unlock it.

These fields can be written to (when authenticated to the card) but not read directly, only challenged. (You can try a PIN, but you can’t see what it’s set too).

As we mentioned before the terminal will ask the card if that’s correct, but the terminal doesn’t know the PIN either.

IMSI

Each subscriber has an IMSI, an International Mobile Subscriber Identity.

IMSIs are hierarchical, starting with 3 digit Mobile Country Code MCC, then the Mobile Network Code (MNC) (2/3 digits) and finally a Mobile Subscription Identification Number (MSIN), a unique number allocated by the operator to the subscribers in their network.

This means although two subscribers could theoretically have the same MSIN they wouldn’t share the same MNC and MCC so the ISMI would still be unique.

The IMSI never changes, unless the subscriber changes operators when they’ll be issued a new USIM card by the new operator, with a different IMSI (differing MNC).

The MSIN isn’t the same as the phone number / MSISDN Number, but an IMSI generally has a MSISDN associated with it by the network. This allows you to port / change MSISDN numbers without changing the USIM/SIM.

K – Subscriber Key

Subscriber’s secret key known only to the Subscriber and the Authentication Center (AuC/ HSS).

All the authentication rests on the principle that this one single secret key (K) known only to the USIM and the AuC/HHS.

OP – Operator Code

Operator Code – same for all SIMs from a single operator.

Used in combination with K as an input for some authentication / authorisation crypto generation.

Because the Operator Code is common to all subscribers in the network, if this key were to be recovered it could lead to security issues, so instead OPc is generally used.

OPc – Operator Code (Derived)

Instead of giving each USIM the Operator Code a derived operator code can be precomputed when the USIM is written with the K key.

This means the OP is not stored on the USIM.

OPc=Encypt-Algo(OP,Key)

PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network)

The PLMN is the combination of MCC & MNC that identifies the operator’s radio access network (RAN) from other operators.

While there isn’t a specific PLMN field in most USIMs it’s worth understanding as several fields require a PLMN.

HPLMNwAcT (HPLMN selector with Access Technology)

Contains in order of priority, the Home-PLMN codes with the access technology specified.

This allows the USIM to work out which PLMN to attach to and which access technology (RAN), for example if the operator’s PLMN was 50599 we could have:

  • 50599 E-UTRAN
  • 50599 UTRAN

To try 4G and if that fails use 3G.

In situations where operators might partner to share networks in different areas, this could be set to the PLMN of the operator first, then it’s partnered operator second.

OPLMNwACT (Operator controlled PLMN selector with Access
Technology)

This is a list of PLMNs the operator has a roaming agreement with in order of priority and with the access technology.

An operator may roam to Carrier X but only permit UTRAN access, not E-TRAN.

FEHPLMN (Equivalent HPLMN)

Used to define equivalent HPMNs, for example if two carriers merge and still have two PLMNs.

FPLMN (Forbidden PLMN list)

A list of PLMNs the subscriber is not permitted to roam to.

HPPLMN (Higher Priority PLMN search period)

How long in seconds to spend between each PLMN/Access Technology in HPLMNwAcT list.

ACC (Access Control Class)

The ACC allows values from 0-15, and determines the access control class of the subscriber.

In the UK the ACC values is used to restrict civilian access to cell phone networks during emergencies.

Ordinary subscribers have ACC numbers in the range 0 – 9. Higher priority users are allocated numbers 12-14.

During an emergency, some or all access classes in the range 0 – 9 are disabled.

This means service would be could be cut off to the public who have ACC value of 0-9, but those like first responders and emergency services would have a higher ACC value and the network would allow them to attach.

AD (Administrative Data)

Like the ACC field the AD field allows operators to drive test networks without valid paying subscribers attaching to the network.

The defined levels are:

  • ’00’ normal operation.
  • ’80’ type approval operations.
  • ’01’ normal operation + specific facilities.
  • ’81’ type approval operations + specific facilities.
  • ’02’ maintenance (off line).
  • ’04’ cell test operation.

GID 1 / 2 – Group Identifier

Two group identifier fields that allow the operator to identify a group of USIMs for a particular application.

SPN (Service Provider Name)

The SPN is an optional field containing the human-readable name of the network.

The SPN allows MVNOs to provide their own USIMs with their name as the operator on the handset.

ECC (Emergency Call Codes)

Codes up to 6 digits long the subscriber is allowed to dial from home screen / in emergency / while not authenticated etc.

MSISDN

Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number. The E.164 formatted phone number of the subscriber.

This is optional, as porting may overwrite this, so it doesn’t always match up.

References:

https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/131100_131199/131102/12.05.00_60/ts_131102v120500p.pdf

IMTx: NET02x (4G Network Essentials) – Mobility Management – 3. Processing Location Updates

EPC, EUTRAN, LTE, Mobile Networks, Notes, RF, , , , ,

These are my lecture notes from IMT’s NET02x (4G Network Essentials) course, I thought I’d post them here as they may be useful to someone. You can find my complete notes here.

Let’s look at how the Tracking Area Updates work from the point of view of the network.

Let’s take an example of a UE which has been sent the Tracking Area List TA0 and TA1, which is currently in ECM_IDLE state served by eNBs in Tracking Area 1.

The UE is moving towards another eNB in Tracking Area 2. As the UE listens on the Broadcast Channel the power of the new eNB overtakes that of the previous eNB, but the UE notes the Tracking Area of the new eNB, which is not on the UE’s Tracking Area List.

So the UE must make a Tracking Area Update to inform the network.

The first thing to do is to establish a radio connection.

Once the radio connection is setup a S1-AP connection is setup, upon which an NAS message – EMM Tracking Area Update Request is sent which contains the GUIT and old Tracking Area ID, which is sent to the MME.

The MME then sends back a new Tracking Area List for the UE and new TMSI to update the GUTI of the subscriber.

The UE updates it’s GUTI, updates it’s Tracking Area List, sends an EMM TRACKING AREA UPDATE COMPLETE and the UE returns to ECM_IDLE state.

Further Reading

IMTx: NET02x (4G Network Essentials) – Mobility Management – 1. Managing Location

EPC, EUTRAN, LTE, Mobile Networks, Notes, RF, , , , , ,

These are my lecture notes from IMT’s NET02x (4G Network Essentials) course, I thought I’d post them here as they may be useful to someone. You can find my complete notes here.

As we saw with the Network Triggered Service Request, the network needs to know which eNB / cell the UE is currently being served by.

The UE knows which cell it should use as it’s always listening on the broadcast channel to know the received power levels of the nearby eNBs.

Paging

If our UE is in ECM IDLE state and the network needs to contact the UE, the eNB sends sends a Paging Request on the Beacon (Broadcast) Channel with the UE’s RNTI.

The UE is always listening on the Beacon Channel for it’s own RNTI, and when it hears it’s own RNTI it follows the process to come back from ECM_IDLE state to ECM_CONNECTED state.

For this to work the network needs to know which eNB to send the Paging request to.

For this to work our UE would need to inform the network each time it changes eNB, but, as we’ve touched upon several times, minimizing power consumption is a constant architecture constraint in LTE.

So if the UE has to transmit each time a UE moves to a different eNB / Cell, the UE power consumption would be high and the battery life of the UE would be low.

If we imagine driving along a freeway at speed, with each eNB serving an area of 1km, at 60kph, our UE would change cells every minute, and if the UE needs to transmit to let the network know it’s changing location, we’d be transmitting data every 60 seconds even if the UE is sitting in our pocket, all these transmissions would lead to lower battery life on the UE.

Tracking Areas

To work around the power wastage of each UE transmitting data to the network to let it know each time it changes eNB, 3GPP designers decided to group eNBs in the same geographic area into Tracking Areas or TAs.

This means instead of the network knowing exactly which eNB a UE is located in, it has it’s location down to a tracking area made up of several eNBs. (Tens to hundreds of cells per TA)

To go back to our freeway example, we might group all the eNBs along a freeway into one Tracking Area, all of which broadcast the ID of each eNB and the Tracking Area of each eNB.

As the UE moves from one eNB to another eNB in the same Tracking Area, there’s no need for the UE to send a Tracking Area Update message as it’s reamining in the same Tracking Area.

Tracking Area Update messages only need to be sent when the UE moves to an eNB in a different Tracking Area.

UEs can move from cell to cell inside TA1 without needing to update the network.
Only when a UE moves from a eNB / cell in TA1 to TA2, does it need to send a Tracking Area Update message to the network.

Paging a Tracking Area

As the network knows the location of our UE down to a tracking area, when it comes time to Page a UE a Paging Request is simply sent from the MME to all eNBs in the Tracking Area that the UE is in.

This means the RNTI of the UE is broadcast out of all eNBs in that tracking Area, and the UE establishes connectivity once again with it’s nearest eNB.